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what people are writing about

BOOKS
Economics & The Public Purpose
by John Kenneth Galbraith,
Houghton-Mifflin Company, Bos
ton, 1973, 334 pages, $10.

Professor Galbraith climaxes his
many books on economics and the
social fabric with this massive the
sis. For that it is. Dr. Galbraith’s
economic credentials are impressive
but the purpose of this book is car
ried in the second part of its title,
“. . . and the public purpose.”

Dr. Galbraith thinks the present
state of economics—its theories, its

truisms, its workings—flatly contra
dicts any true public purpose, and
he makes a good case of it. To start
with, he defines the old Adam
Smith school of economic theory
and shows how that had application
in a world of small entrepreneurs.
Its rules roughly worked. But that
world has largely disappeared, he
believes, or at least it is largely
subservient now to an entirely new
world of economic entities which
can safely defy the old “laws” of
economics, can set their own prices,
and can depend on government
rescue expeditions if anything goes
wrong.
This new world of economic
baronies he defines as the dominant

sector of the economy, the Planning
System, where management is the
new Lord of the World. Compa
nies in the Planning System are not
owned by anyone, he points out,
their stockholders are merely pas
sive participants in their profits.
They exist for one reason only, to
perpetuate themselves and the
“technostructure” they support.
The lesser sector of the economy
is made up of the Market System,
the world of small companies, of
service enterprises, of individual
proprietors. Here the neoclassical
economics do work, he points out,
here true competition does exist,
here labor is truly mobile. But the
fact that this market system is com
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pletely subservient to the planning
system, that it exists on crumbs
from the rich man’s table, as it
were, makes the market system al
ways less powerful, less influential,
more depression-prone than its
more potent colleague.
Effect on policy

Since the planning system wields
so much power, since it embraces
entire administrations rather than
one or two venal legislators, its ef
fect on public policy is vital and
dangerous. To take the most cur
rent example, Galbraith argues
that the automobile and gasoline
producers in the planning sector
forced Government acceptance of
a vast roadwork system, which in
turn increased demand for the
manufacturers’ products. In the
meantime, the nation’s railroads
withered away to the point almost
of no return. Now, with an “energy
crisis” that threatens severe heating
shortages in our northern cities, the
idea of seriously curtailing gasoline
consumption by automobiles is not
even considered. Perhaps now it
can’t be. Cities have grown up
without public transportation, with
suburbs located miles from the
places where people work. These
suburbs sans sidewalks themselves
were created by the ubiquitous
automobile. Most are so isolated
that not only the wage earner must
drive but his crypto-servant wife
must maintain another machine in
order to shop for food and neces
sities.
And all this while businesses and
schools may have to close early
through the winter months because
there’s not enough fuel to heat
them.
The crypto-servant wife line may
have flagged attention a few sec
onds back. It is Galbraith’s theory
that women have become crypto
servants—chauffeurs driving those
superfluous cars, laundresses doing
the family washing in shiny new
washing machines, or stacking
dishes in dishwashing machines.
They are all consumers of the prod
ucts spawned by the planning sec
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tor. That is what they are trained
to be, and that is their own and
others’ conventional view of them.
It is the conventional view be
cause the planning system, whose
products the crypto-servants have
been brainwashed into consuming,
regardless of need or utility, has
willed it so. For the planning sys
tem must still sell its goods well
enough to keep its stockholders
satisfied. It does not really compete
any more. It simply holds its own
and perpetuates its technostruc
ture. It endures strikes because any
gains labor makes are simply re
flected in higher prices to its con
sumers. If foreign countries under
sell it domestically, it simply ex
ports its manufacturing arm to the
country where production costs are
lower. It can locate anywhere, sell
most of what it produces, whether
it’s good or bad, by shrewd adver
tising, and control or directly in
fluence government decisions that
help its market.
Here the analogy is even clearer
in the case of defense contractors
than it is in the case of the high
way lobby which has done so much
for automobiles and petroleum, for
air pollution, and for our present
fuel crisis. Defense contractors de
cide what they want to build; their
counterparts in the Defense Agen
cies insist they need that particular
weapon or weapons system desper
ately; each side, contractors and
Defense Agencies, cooperates on a
campaign to persuade the public
that there is some drastic new
threat from abroad (Russia today,
China until recently) that can only
be countered by vast investments
in the new weapon. The new wea
pon is contracted and built in
plants financed by the Government.
Losses are absorbed by the Gov
ernment, overrun costs paid, and, if
in spite of all this the companies
still face trouble, the Government
will lend them the money to keep
them afloat.
Two bureaucracies, in Galbraith’s
view, reinforce each other: the
bureaucracy of the company tech
nostructure and the bureaucracy of

the particular service that wants
the system. This is a symbiotic re
lationship in which each side of the
partnership, business and Govern
ment, aids and strengthens the
other.
Such symbiotic relationships ex
ist between nearly all businesses
large enough to require regulation
and the Government bureaus de
signed to regulate them, Galbraith
charges. The Food and Drug Ad
ministration has notoriously erred
for the benefit of the food pro
ducers and the drug manufacturers.
Perhaps a slight exception might
be made in the case of the Fed
eral Communications Commission,
which has been making threatening
noises about the television net
works since the Watergate scan
dals and the network coverage of
them. But, by and large, the Fed
eral regulatory agencies have been
most notable for their cooperation
with their charges.
Where are the remedies?

These are Galbraith’s charges
and his theories. Given his first
thesis, that the conventional theory
of economics is as out of touch
with today’s realities as the paddle
wheel steamer, there seems to be
little one can argue with in his
analysis, though most of what he
criticizes has been pointed out for
years. His theories as to what to do
about it are another matter. He
would equalize pay between the
planning and the market systems,
although he doesn’t specify how.
He would make any corporation
doing more than 30 per cent of its
business with the Government a
branch of the Government, paying
the original stockholders fair mar
ket value for their shares. He would
set ecological limits on the harm
any company could do to the en
vironment, but within those limits
leave the company complete free
dom to determine how it was going
to make its products. The remedies,
without detail, sound as though
they might lead to greater abuses
than the disease.
One amusing note: His entire
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analysis, of course, runs directly
counter to the Administration’s
most cherished theories and prac
tices. So it is not too surprising that
one review, written by an Admin
istration apologist, takes stern is
sue with the crypto-servant role of
women, and points out proudly
that women working outside the
home have risen from 24 per cent
in 1950 to 42 per cent today. The
reviewer seems to have overlooked
entirely the fact that the book spec
ifies on page 267, speaking of the
planning system:
“Here a permanently subordinate
caste, consisting extensively al
though not exclusively of women,
is consigned to a role of advertised
inferiority. Not only is it agreed
that compensation for secretarial,
literary, communication, computa
tion and like tasks should be far
below that for privileged ranks but
will remain closed to those who
perform these functions . . .”
Crypto-servants from nine to five
only, perhaps?
This is a book that will cause
much discussion and should cer
tainly be read by everyone con
cerned with modern corporate en
terprise. It is much more convinc
ing when it dissects the myths of
conventional economic “truths”
than it is in prescribing remedies
for what ails the body politic and
economic. Perhaps another book is
on the way. Certainly another one
seems called for.
R.M.S.

Public Budgeting and Manage
ment by Alan Walter Steiss, D.C.

Heath and Company, Lexington,
Mass., 1972, 349 pages, $12.50.
This relatively simple and nonmathematical explanation of the use
of management science techniques
in public administration also has
application to nonprofit organiza
tions and in some cases to business.

Here is another case of a mis
leading title. This one sounds like
a textbook for a government class.
Actually, it is a manual of man
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agement science directed, but not
limited, to the public sector.
The inappropriateness of the title
is instantly demonstrated in the
preface by the author’s definition
of public management: “the appli
cation of management science tech
niques to the field of public ad
ministration.” First, of course, he
has to describe the basic manage
ment science techniques, and his
relatively intelligible explanation of
such concepts as basic systems an
alysis, decision making, authority
relationships, information theory
and communication flow, PERT
and CPM, matrix analysis, uncer
tainty, and feedback are just as
applicable to business as to gov
ernment.
Public management

In the first part of the book Dr.
Steiss explains these techniques
and applies them to public man
agement. This section concludes
with a suggested model for public
decision making.
Public budgeting

The second part of the book deals
with the process of public budget
ing as a means of resource alloca
tion. The basic systems planning
approach is elaborated, and the
cost-effectiveness analysis is ex
amined in some detail. The au
thor concedes that PPBS (PlanningPrograming-Budgeting System) has
fallen out of favor in the Fed
eral government, but he feels that
the basic idea of program budget
ing-presenting budgetary requests
in terms of program packages rath
er than in the usual line-item for
mat—is sound and should be re
tained. He concludes with an anal
ysis of the politics of public
budgeting.
Applications widespread

This book, which is not at all
hard to read, has applicability to
all levels of government and, to
some degree, to business and non
profit organizations as well.
L.S.

Corporate Management in Crisis:
Why the Mighty Fall by Joel E.
Ross and Michael J. Kami, Pren
tice-Hall, Inc., Englewood Cliffs,
N.J., 1973, 263 pages, $7.95.

With the benefit of 20-20 hind
sight, these authors retell the grim
tales of recent business history.
Their point: don’t make the same
mistakes.

What do the names Lockheed,
Ling-Temco-Vought, A&P, Litton,
and Penn Central bring to mind?
Billion dollar corporations that suf
fered major reverses. The business
press has extensively covered the
gory details of their failures. What
Messrs. Ross and Kami do is first
to repeat these well-known stories,
then show how these errors relate
to a basic list of management fun
damentals, and finally provide the
reader with a check-off list to eval
uate his own company’s manage
ment strength.
It’s a well-written book, easy
colorful reading, and it may be a
painless way to remind managers
how easy it is to ignore basics.
For instance, according to the
authors, AT&T and A&P were two
companies suffering from “harden
ing of corporate arteries.” This con
dition resulted from, “Permitting
rigor mortis to set in because of
complacence, nepotism, apathy, a
protected market gained through a
monopoly position or patent, or
management menopause. Leads to
rigidity and bureaucratization.”
While for want of better strategy
organization, Ling-Temco-Vought
“grew so fast and was so disorgan
ized that there wasn’t time for
structure, coordination, and there
was little communication between
parts,” the authors explain.
Besides listing the “bad guys”
(those corporate managements that
made mistakes), the authors list a
couple of corporate managements
they feel are the “good guys.” Since
this book is so closely tied to cur
rent events, deciding which com
panies are to be on each side of
the fence is a risky business.
For example, ITT is one of the
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“good guys.” In pointing out the
characteristics that bring about this
designation, the authors list, among
other traits, “Doesn’t only react but
causes change. Noted for reaction
to and anticipation of ecology and
other social demands.”
Uncomfortable advice

Some of the advice to manage
ment offered by the authors may
not sit well with all readers. For
instance, one of the lessons to
learn from the collapse of the Penn
Central, they say, is, “Don’t de
pend on the establishment to pro
tect you. Government agencies, reg
ulatory bodies, consultants, ac
countants, and other watchdogs
have interests that may conflict
with your own.”
Among the lessons to be learned
by executives in a service industry
from the misadventures of Pan Am
and Eastern Airlines is, “Maintain
some management depth. If you
must go outside for managers, con
sider hiring them yourself rather
than asking a consultant or ‘body
snatcher.’ ”
The authors take another swipe
at consultants when they advise
against buying a turnkey operation:
“Some computer manufacturers and
some consultants will try to sell
you the ‘turnkey’ system—one that
is designed and debugged and
ready for you to ‘push the button’
or ‘turn the key.’ Warning: Don’t
buy it! First, the chances are good
that you will have to spend a lot
of time educating him in your op
erations. Second, installing the sys
tem without substantial prepara
tion is likely to result in chaos.
Third, if you don’t have the capable
staff to design your own systems, it
is unlikely that the same staff can
operate it after it’s ‘installed’ by the
consultant.”
Avoid accounting manipulations,
the authors warn. They place the
ultimate blame for the publication
of financial statements that are
“something less than factual” on
corporate management; although
they do say, “Perhaps the account
ing profession is at fault. Are they
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not independent professionals and
can they not arrive at precise fig
ures based upon commonly ac
cepted principles? The answer, of
course, is yes—and no!”
Although the authors may not be
enamored with the accounting pro
fession or consultants, their book is
interesting—especially if you’re a
few years behind in your periodical
reading.
l.h.d.

Paradise Lost: The Decline of
the Auto-Industrial Age by Emma
Rothschild, Random House, New

York, 1973, 264 pages, $6.95.
This is a bad season for indus
trial giants. Almost simultaneously
with the publication of Galbraith’s
Economics & The Public Purpose
comes Ms. Rothschild’s Paradise
Lost, which details the breakdown
of an industry that has all the
characteristics of Galbraith’s plan
ning sector, an immense techno
structure, and the ability to con
trol both the Government and its
markets. It is the industrial exam
ple par excellence of an industry
that controls its prices and estab
lishes its market through adver
tising.

However, there is one distinct
difference between the two books.
Whereas Galbraith’s technostruc
ture perpetuates itself endlessly,
he has, in his generalities, over
looked the factor of time. Ms.
Rothschild concentrates on it in her
study of one particular industry,
that of the American automobile
manufacturers. For her thesis is
that the automobile, preeminent
among all American products,
gained its reputation in the 20s and
30s, and is today the product of a
mature if not obsolescent industry.
Moreover, it’s an industry that’s
frozen in the patterns of the past.
It has two gods, Henry Ford and
Alfred Sloan, both men of the ear
lier part of the century, who set up
patterns in which automobile manu
facture has been locked ever since:
Ford established the assembly line

manufacturing technique; Sloan the
selling methods by which slight
styling changes and flashy new
color combinations replaced honest
changes in engineering or automo
tive design.
The social difficulty lies in the
overwhelming effect the automo
bile has had on every phase of
American life and livelihood. Now
the nation has almost too much
committed to the car to sacrifice it.
Cities without anything else ex
cept air transport would strangle
without it. Towns without even air
connections would wither and die.
Ms. Rothschild sees these impli
cations clearly, except that she
doesn’t seem to absorb their full
seriousness to this country. Her
most common reference to the
present problems caused by the
automobile is to the great age of
railroad expansion in Great Britain,
when whole new cities were cre
ated by the burgeoning railroads,
cities which she points out, were
hard hit when the railroads which
had created them went out of ex
istence.
But England, according to the
writer, just came into prominence
in the automobile manufacturing
picture in the 40s and 50s. In other
words, it had an alternative ready
for its overextended railroads when
they finally collapsed.
We weren’t so wise or our his
tory didn’t permit us to be. For we
built entire communities on the
automobile alone; we geared our
environment deliberately so that an
automobile became almost an es
sential of life.
One example: Although Eastern
ers and residents of older Mid
western cities with their subways
and rapid transit systems can ad
just to carelessness (many New
Yorkers would never consider pri
vate car transportation unless they
were absolutely forced to), Los
Angeles, the automotive nightmare
of the world, has no public trans
portation system of any descrip
tion. A car, any kind of car, is es
sential there.
Yet in 1920, when Los Angeles
was still a small city, and when the
Management Adviser

automobile was just beginning to
become prominent on the Amer
ican scene, Los Angeles was noted
for having one of the best public
transportation systems in any mu
nicipality.
The automobile killed it.
Now, of course, it is the muchheralded energy crisis that brings
all these things into focus sharply.
But the Arab actions are only the
smallest part of an energy crisis
that’s been waiting in the wings for
years.
Blindness in Detroit

Yet Detroit, even while it touted
new interior trim on its models or
bumpers that could actually en
dure a bump, steadily ignored this
possibility as it did so many others.
It refused to consider the Wan
kel engine that the Japanese were
steadily perfecting. Wankels of
course do nothing to alleviate a
shortage of gasoline; they merely
meet Government pollution emis
sion standards. Detroit put on a be
lated and expensive chase for the
catalytic converter but now argues
that it can’t be refined sufficiently
to meet pollution standards in time
to meet the law’s provisions.
Catalytic converters are addi
tions to existing cars and justify a
price increase. Wankel engines
would involve redesigning entire
production facilities, and could not
be used to justify cost increases.
After all, inexpensive Japanese cars
already have such an engine.
With a petroleum shortage and
gas rationing in some form (no
matter who assures us optimistic
ally that “it won’t come to that”)
already being planned, the whole
issue has now become academic.
But the long-term refusal of Amer
ican manufacturers to build small
cars competitive with the Japanese
and German models which had al
ready stolen so much of their mar
ket is not academic.
The difficulty seems to lie in the
obsession of American makers with
the principles of Fordism and
Sloanism. Under Ford, mass pro
duction was everything. Under
January-February, 1974

Sloan, forced obsolescence and
trivial apparent changes were. Un
derneath, the industry has been
producing the same basic car, in
three different models, for years.
Each of the three has different bod
ies put on or over it, different op
tions attached, white wall or stan
dard tires put on. But the basic cars
remain unchanged.
And the basic factories that make
them. Radical engine changes, such
as converting from the ancient in
ternal combustion to the Wankel
engine, cost money, and for years
automobile makers have been chary
about investing their money in
their own industry.
The record shows it—the inevit
able consequences of an endlessly
penny-wise, pound-foolish attitude.
“Americans still want a big car ...”
when Volkswagens and Toyotas
had already taken over ten per
cent of the buyers’ market. The
hurried suggestion that emission
control devices prepared by the
Americans should be scrapped be
cause they would be wasteful of
fuel—while the Wankel engine re
mained almost completely unex
plored. The assertion that Wankel
engines couldn’t power standard
sized American cars only weeks be
fore Government tests proved con
clusively that they could.
The one response of the Amer
icans, the General Motors “new”
automobile plant at Lordstown,
Ohio, has, far from becoming a
sign for a hopeful future, become a
symbol for a past that’s long been
over. Lordstown, constructed in a
heavily agricultural area, was de
signed to build an American small
car, as an offset to the foreign im
ports that were threatening De
troit. But it was organized on the
same lines that had proved so suc
cessful for Detroit in the early
halcyon days of the industry: mass
production, production to a stop
watch. And the supervisors were
those whom the manufacturer was
keeping an eye on for the future.
In other words, the best symbols
of the shining future were those
who had been most deserving of
management’s approbation in the

past. Lordstown was to be their
proving ground as Viet Nam was
to be the professional officers’ route
to having his “ticket punched” and
winning quick promotions.
Not surprisingly, Lordstown, the
key to the future, became, in spite
of its largely rural population, al
most a bellwether of industrial un
rest.
The workers resented their hardboiled supervisors. They resented
having to produce repair shop
receipts to document an absence
from work (no one could get
to Lordstown unless he owned a
car) when they were automobile
men themselves and could usually
have fixed the difficulty in 15 min
utes. But then they would have
been late to work. So they paid
their exorbitant repair bills and lost
half a day at work and got their
all-important receipt.
And eventually, this nice, native
rural population of workers went
on strike in 1972 against “condi
tions.” And by that they meant
working conditions not wages,
which no one ever denied were
generous.
It is a serious picture Ms. Roths
child presents, that of an industry
that has so oversold its market with
inferior products that its market
has rebelled against it to the de
gree that it could. Given the arti
ficial dependence on the automo
bile that the industry has carefully
nurtured and the sudden realiza
tion of a fuel crisis that should
have been foreseen years ago (and
was by many), it is a picture of
blindness to needs and wishes that
would be ludicrous if its conse
quences were not so serious.
This is a book, convincing in
every fact reported, that should be
must reading for everyone con
cerned with an industry where for
eign competition, particularly com
petition that has arisen since the
War, is a serious threat. It is a pic
ture of a native industry that by
having its own imperious way and
by blind devotion to a pair of out
moded principles has been busily
engaged for nearly 50 years in dig
ging its own grave.
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The Rape of the Taxpayer: Why
You Pay More While the Rich
Pay Less by Philip M. Stern,
Random House, New York, 1973,

483 pages, $10 (cloth bound), Vin
tage, $2.45 (paperbound).

This indignant attack on the In
ternal Revenue Code is intended
to provoke public demand for tax
reform.
In theory, the Federal income tax
is a progressive tax, based on abil
ity to pay, that hits the high-in
come taxpayer harder than the
poor. Actually, as this book dem
onstrates, it’s the middle-income
citizen who suffers most.
On paper, the effective tax rate
(tax as a percentage of total in
come) should be 45 per cent for
someone with an income of $100,000 a year; actually it is about 30
per cent. Some people with in
comes over $200,000 a year pay
no income tax at all; many others
pay less than 10 per cent. Why?
Because the tax law is ridden with
loopholes and tax shelters, of
course, and this book maintains a
high fever of indignation about
them for nearly 500 pages.
Mr. Stern borrows an idea origi
nated by Stanley S. Surrey, a for
mer Assistant Secretary of the
Treasury, of classifying as “tax ex
penditures” the cost to the Treas
ury (in revenues that otherwise
would be due) of the exemptions,
deductions, allowances, and other
preferences that undermine the os
tensible Federal income tax rates.
Mr. Stern refers to these “expendi
tures” (which are costs to all tax
payers) as welfare payments.
On this basis, he claims, the 1972
cost to the taxpayers in lost rev
enues came to $77 billion. This
amounts, he says, to a Federal wel
fare program “that gave each of
America’s 3,000 richest families
$720,000 a year of your hardearned money.”
In many cases these tax loop
holes are subsidies—to state and
local governments (the exemption
of interest on their bonds), to
home owners (the home owner
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ship deductions), and to business
(oil, shipping, even clam and oys
ter shells). Most profitable corpo
rations pay about a 35 per cent in
come tax rate (on paper it is 48
per cent); some of the nation’s
most successful companies pay al
most no income tax. Some of these
subsidies are deliberate and gen
erally accepted as desirable; some
are almost accidental, slipped into
an incredibly complex tax law by
Congressmen serving special inter
ests (occasionally following Con
gressional or Presidential rejection
of an actual subsidy bill).
It would be better, Mr. Stern
feels, if subsidies were open and
aboveboard rather than concealed
in the tax statutes. That would al
low more honest debate on their
merits. More important, it would
prevent their cost being borne so
overwhelmingly by the least fa
vored of all taxpayers, the unmar
ried individual with income entire
ly from wages and with personal
deductions too small to itemize.
Tax loopholes detailed

Mr. Stern outlines in great de
tail the various sources of inequi
ties in the income tax burden; mu
nicipal bonds, capital gains, and a
myriad of tax shelters (oil, real es
tate, cattle, the leasing of locomo
tives and airplanes, clam and oy
ster shells, the “rent-a-cow” busi
ness, the “Mexican vegetable roll
over,” and other little known but
fascinating gimmicks).
He attacks such cherished escape
valves of the middle class as mar
ital income-splitting, deductions for
costs of home ownership, and the
personal exemption, on the grounds
that they, too, help the rich more
than the poor. He even dares to
criticize special income tax treat
ment for the aged and the blind
(why not sufferers from muscular
dystrophy?), all in the name of
consistency and complete equity.
Mr. Stem favors taxation of
all income at a progressive (but
much lower than the present) rate
with no exemptions, with open sub
sidies for housing, oil, charities, and

any other causes deemed worthy of
them. Not all readers will agree,
but all will find this book fascinat
ing, eminently readable, and dis
turbing.
The book has its flaws, of course.
Its research is solidly based, mostly
on work done by the Brookings In
stitution, but there is so much of
it that an accountant would have
no trouble finding instances in
which arithmetical errors or errors
of interpretation produced a wrong
answer. There is so much in the
way of statistical data that even the
figure-oriented reader may feel a
little overwhelmed.
More serious is a certain sloppi
ness in the way that it is all put
together. As the author admits in
the preface, the book is essentially
an updating, with a good deal of
completely new material, of an ear
lier (1964) work of his, The Great
Treasury Raid. Unfortunately, to
save work, many of the tables and
examples from the earlier book
have been carried over almost in
tact, with merely a footnote or an
added paragraph to indicate that
later tax laws have changed the
figures.
This is particularly a problem
for the reader who is thinking of
using the book as a guide for tax
avoidance rather than as a polemic
against it. This is perfectly feasible
—certainly the material is detailed
enough—and Mr. Stern would not
disapprove. He does not criticize
those who take advantages of the
law to save themselves money; “In
deed, being blessed with sub
stantial means,” (Mr. Stern is an
heir of a founder of Sears, Roebuck
and Co.) “I do so myself.” How
ever, it demands incredibly careful
reading, since many descriptions of
tax shelters and loopholes are neg
ated or modified by subsequent
sentences, paragraphs, or footnotes
that bring up later tax legislation.
This kind of updating is under
standable, in view of the sheer bulk
of the book, but inconvenient for
the reader; a complete rewrite
would have been better.
The style, while eminently
simple, is occasionally irritating:
Management Adviser

“But what is a billion dollars? How
can one comprehend such a stu
pendous number?” It is true that
the message is aimed directly at the
man in the street and it has to be
brought down to his level, but the
result is often tedious for the more
sophisticated.
Nevertheless, this is an impor
tant book. Its facts are of vital im
portance to every American, and
its recommendations are worthy of
serious study (particularly the in
sight that special privileges written
into the law are inevitable so long
as Congressmen’s campaigns must
be financed by the corporations
and the seekers of special privilege
—Mr. Stern would have political
campaigns financed by the govern
ment). Reportedly there are now
mutterings within the Administra
tion about having another go at
tax reform. Mr. Stern’s indignation
will be more than repaid if public
opinion forces some real action at
last.
l.s.

Supermoney by ‘Adam Smith,’
Popular Library, New York, 1973,
287 pages, $1.95 (paperbound).

‘Adam Smith,’ the author of The
Money Game, has done it again
in this tale of tangled financial
dealings.
Amusing and anecdotal, this
book reveals no sure route to
riches in the stock market but it
does detail some horror stories of
what not to do, including the tale
of a Swiss Bank that cornered the
world market in cocoa at a time
when cocoa prices were sliding,
then doctored its books to conceal
the loss and ended up with a $20
million loss. ‘Adam Smith’ had a
particular interest in this; he
owned part of the bank.
Amusing, well-written, and to
the point, Supermoney in paper
back would be a perfect com
panion for a plane journey or, now
that the fuel crisis is with us, an
Amtrak trip.
R.M.S.
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Social Responsibility Audit: A
Management Tool for Survival
by John Humble, Foundation for
Business Responsibilities, Room
18-11 Portland House, Stag Place,
London SW1E 5BS, 1973, 60 pages,
1.25 pounds ($3.20), paper bound,
quantity discounts available.

With this little booklet, a well
known British management consult
ant gets on the “social audit” band
wagon, offering his own blueprint
for an audit of management’s social
responsibilities.
A lot of businessmen are talking
about social responsibility and so
cial auditing these days, and most
consultants are eager to establish
their credentials in this field. This
book offers such a bid from John
Humble, a director of Urwick Orr
and Partners, the large British
management consulting firm.
Because, in his view, the profit
motive must come first, Mr. Hum
ble suggests that corporations limit
their definitions of their social re
sponsibilities to areas of enlight
ened self-interest rather than rais
ing moral or ethical issues: “Is it
possible to have a meaningful cor
porate ethical view?”
After reviewing the growing
pressures on business to recognize
its social responsibilities more ex
plicitly, Mr. Humble endorses the
basic idea of the social audit and
advocates its inclusion in the regu
lar planning process. He briefly dis
cusses the purposes of the audit,
the responsibility for it, participa
tion in it, limitations on its scope,
and its intended audience without
taking any particular position on
these issues. Then he goes on to
present his own questionnaire for
a social audit by a company, gov
ernmental agency, or nonprofit or
ganization.
The principal headings under
which Mr. Humble recognizes aud
itable areas are the external en
vironment (social responsibilities
and opportunities, community re
lations, consumer relations, pollu
tion, packaging, investment rela
tions, and shareholder relations)

and the internal environment (phys
ical environment, working condi
tions, minority groups, organiza
tion structure and management
style, communications, industrial re
lations, and education and train
ing). Under each category he rec
ommends listing the organization’s
strengths, weaknesses, opportuni
ties, and threats and what action it
should take.
This “paper is a personal and
highly tentative view of a field full
of uncertainty,” Mr. Humble em
phasizes. His audit plan, which is
somewhat superficial and does not
seem to be the product of deep
thought or extensive research, nev
ertheless should be a helpful ref
erence tool for any manager think
ing of developing his own social
audit or for any consultant consid
ering offering such a service.
L.S.

Corporate Lib: Women’s Chal
lenge to Management by Eli

Ginzberg and Alice M. Yohalem
(Editors), The Johns Hopkins Uni
versity Press, Baltimore, Maryland,
1973, 168 pages, $6.50 (cloth
bound), $2.50 (paperbound).

Not just another rehash of the
arguments for and against women in
management, this little volume pro
vides one of the most provocative
assessments to date of their chances
for making it.
The editors of this book, a sym
posium on women’s prospects of
entering the executive suite, con
clude — somewhat questionably —
that “women have challenged man
agement, and it is a reasonable
prognosis that management, wom
en, and the nation will never be
the same again.”
The book is the product of a
conference, sponsored by the Co
lumbia University Graduate School
of Business, held at Arden House
in the fall of 1971. Its contents are
the principal speeches given at that
meeting by a dozen economists,
sociologists, and educators, most of
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them women; a representative of
the U. S. Department of Labor
(male); and a personnel executive
(male).
As is always the case with such
anthologies, the presentations vary
widely in points of view as well as
in quality, significance, and sub
ject matter. To arrive at a sum
mary the editors really had to
reach, and in the case of the sum
mary quoted above they reached
too far.
There was no consensus among
the speakers that women are on
their way into management. (One
speaker even suggested consolingly
that management really is no place
to be, even for men.)
There was consensus that dis
crimination exists in the corpora
tion structure and that it will not
be easy to overcome. That, how
ever, besides being well known,
was the point of departure rather
than the conclusion. As to what
could—or should—be done about it,
opinions differed, in some cases
sharply.
Edward A. Robie, senior vice
president, Equitable Life Assur
ance Society, declared, “Business
and industry should give a high
priority to revising the channels of
access to management so that a
greater percentage of qualified
women can reach management po
sitions. There are a lot of good rea
sons why we should do this, and no
good reasons why we should not.”
Why? “From a management point
of view, perhaps the strongest ar
gument for revision of employment
practices so as to increase the
number of women in management
positions is that industry can sim
ply no longer afford to waste so
valuable & resource. . . . Every
available source of talent must be
tapped if we are to cope effectively
and competitively with [business’s
complex] problems.”
How? Among other means, by
more flexibility in work scheduling
and compensation arrangements,
by provision of child care, and by
a conscious policy of recruiting
women for entry-level management
positions to meet the complaint of
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one female manager quoted by
Mr. Robie, “Nobody knows how
well we can do in management
jobs because no company gives
enough of us a chance to get the
experience that would prove or dis
prove the allegations that we won’t
do well.”
The opposing view

Valerie K. Oppenheimer, research
sociologist at the University of Cal
ifornia at Los Angeles, disagreed
with Mr. Robie on virtually every
point of fact.
“If I were in personnel manage
ment,” she said, “it would take
many more persuasive reasons than
these to get me moving. For ex
ample, Mr. Robie argues that by
1980 six million more women will
be in the work force and no work
organization can effectively digest
such a large change in the compo
sition of its labor force without
making changes in the composition
of its managerial ranks.’ I should
like to point out that 31 million
women are already in the labor
force without any accompanying
breakthroughs into management. . .
if most female employees are in the
usual dead end female jobs, I fail
to see what difference it makes
whether women are 20, 40, or 60
per cent or more of the workers in
the enterprise.”
She also scoffed at Mr. Robie’s
assertion that “management is now
going to turn to women because
the problems of today’s world have
become too complex for men alone
to solve . . . regardless of whether
our society would have done bet
ter with the managerial talents of
women, it has certainly managed,
up to now, to function without
these talents.”
Only pressures will work

Continuing high rates of unem
ployment will make it “even more
unlikely, of course, that a spon
taneous desire to bring women into
management will occur. ... if they
do expand the opportunities for
women in management it will be

because they have to—because pres
sures will continue to mount for a
more equalitarian sex distribution
in jobs.”
Some of these pressures have
been translated into law. Discrim
ination in employment by Federal
government contractors and sub
contractors (about one-third of the
labor force) because of race, color,
sex, or national origin was prohib
ited by Executive Order 11246, as
Michael H. Moskow, Assistant Sec
retary of Labor, pointed out. The
Office of Federal Contract Compli
ance is now demanding “affirmative
action” programs such as those
called for in the case of minority
groups.
Women’s need to work

Whether this will result in “token
women” in management or some
thing bigger depends on the state
of the economy and on women
themselves. Women, although held
back by their own conditioning in
home and school as well as by
male opposition, increasingly need
to work, Ms. Oppenheimer pointed
out. Inflation, with its pressures for
a second income; the rising divorce
rate; and the falling birth rate all
push women into the labor market
while a rising level of education
and shrinking employment oppor
tunities in the traditional women’s
fields push them toward men’s jobs.
“With any kind of turndown in
the economy”—and a recession in
1974 is widely predicted— “. . . it is
probably going to be very close to
insuperable to improve female op
portunities,” James W. Kuhn, pro
fessor of industrial relations, Grad
uate School of Business, Columbia
University, warned. “One of the
significant determinants of expand
ing employment opportunities for
women at the executive level will
be overall economic activity. In a
soft labor market there may be ag
gressive competition between the
educated elite of white and black
men and women ... a combination
of more racial polarization, econo
mic recession, and more militant
demands by women may produce
Management Adviser

. . . educated and able white wom
en and equally qualified black
males fighting for token jobs in the
executive suite.”
It would appear that something
even tougher than the methods al
ready employed by the Women’s
Lib groups is going to be needed.
L.S.

How to Win Profits and Influence
Bankers: The Art of Practical
Projecting by Richard C. Belew,
Van Nostrand Reinhold Company,

in the United States, profits are the
yardstick” and “Making profits can
be fun,” that it reads as if it had
been written by a ghost writer.
(Perhaps it was.) But the content
is thorough, comprehensive, and
undoubtedly helpful to the finan
cially unsophisticated.
For the accountant there is noth
ing useful in this book. It offers no
real inside look into a banker’s
mind. But for the small business
man it may well prove invaluable.
L.S.

New York, 1973, 176 pages, $19.95.

Briefly listed

This simple book succeeds in its
simple objective: to show the small
businessman how to prepare finan
cial projections for a prospective
lender.

A Practical Approach to Compu
ter Simulation in Business by L.

The author of this book, who is
executive vice president of Diversi
fied Discount and Acceptance Cor
poration, a Minnesota firm that spe
cializes in business loans, has also
had experience as a bank officer and
president of a bank-affiliated small
business-investment company. Ob
viously he has dealt with a good
many applicants for small business
loans. And obviously, although he
does not spell out the problem in so
many words, many of these appli
cants lacked personnel with the ac
counting know-how needed to sup
port their applications. These are
the people he wrote this book to
help.

This book aims to introduce the
general principles of simulation as
applied to business. Little mathe
matical knowledge is assumed,
though familiarity with the com
puter as a tool is.
Topics covered include: a review
of some statistical concepts; the use
of FORTRAN and CSL for com
puter simulation studies; queuing
systems; forecasting and inventory
control; simulation of other sys
tems (including production control
and profitability analysis); and
sample programs in FORTRAN,
BASIC, and CSL. Relevant statis
tical tables are contained in ap
pendixes.

Financial statements simplified

The book describes, in the sim
plest possible language, how to de
velop forecasts of operations, re
lated cash flow, proforma balance
sheets, and estimated borrowing re
quirements and how to use this in
formation to support loan requests.
He also shows how to forecast the
amount and type of capital the
company will need a year from now
—or up to five years in the future.
The style of the book is so simple
that it verges on the childish. In
deed, the book is dotted with so
many sentences like, “In a freeenterprise economy such as we have
January-February, 1974

R. Carter and E. Huzan, Halsted
Press, New York, 1973, 298 pages,
$15.95.

MAGAZINES
Management Consultants in Non
profit Organizations: A Survey,
Discussion and Recommendations

by Carl W. Nelson, Business Per
spectives, Spring, 1973.

Like many profit-seeking compa
nies, nonprofit organizations en
counter problems which require the
aid of management consultants. Dr.
Nelson discusses the role of con
sultants in nonprofit organizations,
examines the related problems, and
makes recommendations for their
solution.

Management consulting firms can
be of great help to nonprofit or
ganizations, in that they offer ex
pertise in specific problem areas
such as manpower planning, spe
cialized and technical studies, ac
counting and financial matters, etc.
The techniques that consulting
firms use to approach problems are
not usually available to managers
of the nonprofit organization: gen
eral statistical analysis, simulation
programs, etc.
The survey of nonprofit organi
zations, made by the author, shows
some of the problems that exist
when consultants are used in non
profit organizations.
First, the survey showed that
only 43 per cent of the respon
dents were well satisfied with con
sulting firms and stated that they
received “good value for their
money.” The remaining 57 per cent
indicated some dissatisfaction: 40
per cent of the nonprofit organiza
tions rated their experience with
consulting firms as “somewhat ben
eficial” and the remaining 17 per
cent rated their experience with
consulting firms as a “waste of time
and money.”
It is suggested that there are
two reasons for this dissatisfaction.
First, the consulting firms charge
their services to nonprofit organi
zations at the same rate as that
charged to profit-seeking busi
nesses. Since the consultant’s fee
may be a large budget item, the
nonprofit organization may be ex
pecting too much for its money.
Second, the consultants may be
approaching the problems with the
same methods used for solving
problems in a profit-seeking com
pany. At least one critic feels that
consultants ignore the human ele
ment in forming their solutions.
Another problem disclosed by
the survey is that some of the rec
ommendations made by the con
sulting firms were not carried out
solely because the nonprofit organ
izations did not have the resources
to implement the recommenda
tions.
The author makes the following
recommendations, hoping that if
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they are followed, more expertise
will be made available to non
profit organizations:
(1) Consulting firms might offer
their services at a reduced rate to
nonprofit organizations, especially
during slack periods.
(2) Nonprofit organizations could
jointly commission consultant stud
ies and thereby reduce their indi
vidual out-of-pocket costs.
(3) Consultant studies could be
made available to other nonprofit
organizations at a minimal fee espe
cially if they are of general appli
cability.
(4) Professional societies or a com
bination of nonprofit organizations
in a particular social service field
could independently attempt to or
ganize consulting bodies much as
individual industries set up special
study groups.
(5) Consultant organizations could
increase or develop the expertise of
their existing personnel in the so
cial services. This could be accom
plished through changes in hiring
policies or through staff develop
ment programs.
John Marshall
Louisiana State University
at Baton Rouge

Developing Managers Without
Management Development by
Saul W. Gellerman, The Confer
ence Board Record, July, 1973.

Formal management develop
ment programs are ineffective un
less the manager has the oppor
tunity to apply on-the-job what
has been taught in the classroom.
The most important element of
management development is an or
ganizational environment which en
courages managers to learn from
their jobs.

The development of a manager
depends primarily on the quality
of his experience within a firm,
and how well he is encouraged to
use that experience as a learning
technique. If an organization is to
have an adequate supply of com
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petent managers, then that firm
should adopt a general approach
for developing those managers
based on the following principles:
(1) All instructional opportunities,
inherent in the work assigned to a
manager, must be utilized by the
superiors in order to insure maxi
mum experience. Formal instruc
tion is inadequate without the op
portunity to practice what is taught.
(2) A person only learns when
faced with a challenging problem
demanding a creative solution.
(3) The organization itself must be
designed to give managers the op
portunity to learn from experience.
The organization structure must
create conditions in which talented
men can “develop.”
Four aspects of organizational
climate are necessary in order to
develop talented managers:
Organizational Structure — The
author suggests that “the ideal
structure for developmental pur
poses is a small, self-contained unit
requiring little or no external sup
port, which has an undivided re
sponsibility for the attainment of
some major organizational pur
pose.” This task force type of or
ganization has several advantages
over traditional, bureaucratic struc
tures. First, the communication net
work is shorter and faster. Second,
general managerial skills are devel
oped as opposed to functional spe
cialization. And third, identification
and recognition of promising man
agers is maximized.
Job Design—A job will stimulate
manager development if it has been
designed to be at least partially
“unmastered” by the manager. As
long as complete mastery of a job
has not taken place, the manager
will be stimulated for additional
learning. Upon mastery of the pres
ent job, new learning opportunities
must be available to a manager if
his development is to continue.
Also, managerial mistakes should
be used as a “basis for instruction,
rather than punishment.” Errors
should be viewed as simply a part
of the overall development and

learning process of managers, with
the prevailing organizational at
mosphere one of encouraging man
agers to try new and creative solu
tions to their problems, without
fear of embarassment for failure.
Career Planning—The manager
should always be faced with new
learning opportunities, with respon
sibilities being deliberately shifted
among jobs and activities so as to
ensure continuing skill develop
ment. Major modifications of a
manager’s job should occur within
a three-to-five year period. Al
though it is not always possible for
promotion to be the means of mod
ification, the same result can be
achieved simply by changing the
mix of managerial responsibilities.
Control Systems — The control
function of a superior is based on
seeing that subordinates are learn
ing from their jobs. The role of the
superior is one of coaching not
controlling. Only in this way can
the subordinate be allowed the
freedom necessary for learning to
occur.
Robert Carver
University of Missouri

Increasing the Productivity of
Highly Variable Labor by Steven
O. Corrie, The CPA Journal, July,

1973.

Mr. Corrie, of Arthur Andersen
& Co., describes how the imple
mentation of pre-established labor
standards to short-run demand
forecasts improved the operations
of a small photo-finishing company
and led to a significant reduction
in per-unit labor costs.

The article initially compares the
competitive position of small photo
finishing companies with the in
dustry leader, Kodak. Such factors
as lower volume and guaranteed
rapid service lead to more labor in
tensive costs for the smaller com
panies; consequently, maximizing
labor productivity is essential for
the smaller photo-finishing compa
nies competing with Kodak.
Management Adviser

The particular company under
consideration had a highly irregu
lar demand, both in terms of an
nual peaks (Christmas and sum
mer) and weekly peaks (caused
primarily by weekend picture-tak
ing and subsequent film drop-off
on Sunday). This weekly pattern
caused processing requirements
(and hence, labor requirements) to
be unusually high on Monday and
Tuesday (because of promised
rapid service), with a pronounced
drop for the remainder of the week.
Comparison of old and new

The author describes briefly the
old scheduling practices of the
company, which were basically at
tempts to match fluctuating de
mand requirements with the avail
able labor force (both full-time em
ployees and part-time employees,
the latter being obtained on one or
two days’ notice). Demand plots
were made each Thursday to esti
mate the following Monday’s labor
requirements, and department su
pervisors were charged with re
viewing daily volume requirements
and deciding whether adjustments
in the labor force for the next day
were necessary. This practice, along
with hourly wage payments (as op
posed to piecework) and the lack
of departmental standards, led to
several problems. Among those
mentioned by the author were the
overstaffing of part-time help at the
beginning of the week, inefficien
cies of full-time help induced by
the overstaffing, and the tendency
of employees to pace their work
habits to fill each day.
In discussing the new scheduling
practices, Mr. Corrie expounds on
two areas of improvement. First, a
system of departmental labor stan
dards was set up for each main
product line. Second, forecasting
was improved by the implementa
tion of a statistically based fore
casting system. By applying the
standards to the projected daily de
mand requirements, the manpower
requirements for each Monday
were calculated, as well as for the
remaining days of each week.
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The author concludes by listing
the positive benefits of the new
practices. Among these were a re
duction in incidents of overstaffing,
a reduction of costs per unit, and
better management control of la
bor. The cost savings per unit are
especially important, because the
company competes on the basis of
quick service and low price.
John Everett
Oklahoma State University

Sales Reports that Lead to Ac
tion by Sam R. Goodman, Finan
cial Executive, June, 1973.

Sales reports must he removed
from the area of mere custodial re
porting if they are to initiate effec
tive action. This author describes a
system of sales reports which per
mit more creative analysis by mar
keting personnel.

“Sales reports, to be effective,
must make someone act.” In order
to do this, Mr. Goodman suggests
several key points which should be
included in an effective set of sales
reports. Rather than stressing the
dollar volume of product activity,
and what happened yesterday,
these reports should make the mar
keting executive question what
might happen in the future.
Items such as percentage in
creases or decreases and incre
mental profitability provide a more
decision-oriented picture of prod
uct movement. Another item is the
effective division of information by
products, customers, geographic
areas, salesmen, and other catego
ries which will provide “built-in
warning flags that indicate quickly
when remedial action is needed.”
The basic document from which
Mr. Goodman’s sales reports are
drawn is the direct account report.
This report breaks down all sales
data into the basic building blocks
which can then be used to create
all other reports in the series. The
first of these reports to be drawn
from the basic document is the pur
chase record. This report matches

product volume with the dollar in
centives given to customers to
achieve this performance. Percen
tage changes in dollar and volume
of sales from one year to the next
are compared to the similar change
in the market of competition in
order to compare individual cus
tomers to others in that specific
area. An additional comparison can
be made with the various allow
ances which were given to that cus
tomer to promote increased sales.
The second report analyzes cus
tomer mix according to changes in
volume levels within recent per
iods. This allows managers to get a
better picture of the results of their
selling efforts among the largest ac
counts. The third report, one of the
most important in the series, fur
nishes information as to the quality
of sales volume. By dividing cus
tomers in an “ABC inventory” man
ner the manager can see what cate
gories of customers, by yearly vol
ume, provide what percentage of
total volume. In this way many de
cisions can be made about margi
nal customers and where increased
sales effort should be directed.
Such a concept differs from the
more traditional idea of focusing
on increases in total volumes with
out looking at the sales effort
needed to produce that increase.
The next report carries the prod
uct dollar sales by class of trade.
This report can give the manager
information on the performance of
any specialized sales force from
one year to the next, but is meant
to be a report of perspective more
than an action report. It is to be
prepared only once or twice a year.
The last report in the series ana
lyzes geographic profitability. “It is
designed mainly to evaluate total
marketing management and the rel
ative profitability of divisions by
district.” As such, it provides the
logical conclusion to the integrated
sales reporting system which has
been developed. There are many
useful comparisons which can be
made from the information on this
report. One of these is a compari
son by division of geographic sales
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with direct profit. Other compari
sons can be made for promotion
costs, by dollar amount and by per
centage of sales, to sales volume
and volume mix. These compari
sons are useful for evaluating geo
graphic profitability and highlight
ing areas of heaviest promotional
competition.
In summary, Mr. Goodman states
that sales reports which will per
mit creative analysis by marketing
personnel “should not be based on
an accounting system which has
custodial reporting as its main re
sponsibility.” Instead, sales report
ing must be prepared and used in
conjunction with conventional ac
counting systems utilizing current
EDP technology.
Steven Flory
Louisiana State University
at Baton Rouge

Complex Objectives, Decentrali
zation, and the Decision Process
of the Organization, by Clement
G. Krouse, Administrative Science

Quarterly, December, 1972.

By assuming away interunit de
pendencies, a model is developed
with a full separation of relevant
decision variables which can then
be uniquely assigned to the deci
sion-making units. These decision
making units at the operational
level are described as quasiautono
mous units. With this model, the
final organizational decisions op
timal with respect to the complex
objectives of the organization are
determined by upper management
levels. The sequence of decisions
that occurs before the organization
develops its final optimal decisions
are also described; in comparison,
models developed by others in the
past have usually implied a single
step analysis of a set of simulta
neous equations.
The model describes the adapta
tion behavior of target adjustments
by which the organization con
stantly revises its activities. Krouse
describes a target as a general label
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for various terms such as budgets,
standards, quotas, achievement
foci, and aspiration level. He dis
tinguishes between two types of
targets: (1) technical (or first-level)
targets at the operational level
which are directly affected by
agents external to the organization,
and (2) policy (or second-level)
targets which are internally adapt
able through changes in policy by
upper management levels. The pol
icy target is a device by which the
activities of the organization are de
composed and its direction con
stantly revised. The use of the pol
icy targets enables the organization
to substitute a sequence of smaller
problems for a more complex one
and facilitates the decentralized as
signment of the smaller problems to
eliminate most interunit dependen
cies.
Decentralization arises in Krouse’s
model as the result of the formula
tion of subgoals through goal de
composition. However, since man
agers cannot consider all the organ
izational relations simultaneously
and efficiently, they are cognitively
unable to decompose the goals
themselves. Planning and coordi
nating toward the organization’s
objectives are the responsibilities of
upper management levels and in
volve the assignment and experi
mental adjustment of targets di
rected toward the achievement of
the overall corporate goal. Upper
levels of management establish spe
cific target assignments for the
operations level units to perform
accordingly. The task is simplified
for the operations level units: each
organizational activity (directed to
ward a target) has only a small
number of variables to manipulate.
Furthermore, each activity is as
sumed to be performed autono
mously at any given time.
Upper level management there
fore directs targets down to the op
erations level units. The operations
level units are autonomous in the
model, subject only to targets passed
down to them from upper level
managers. The operations level
units determine efficiency prices by
their activity and feed this infor

mation back to upper levels of
management. Management, in turn,
adjusts the targets and sends down
new targets to the operations level
units. The organization’s problem
solving process is thus conceived as
one of trial and error—an experi
mental process that is both itera
tive and closed-loop.
Multiple objective model

A multiple-argument objective
criterion (a utility function) model
is recognized. Many past models
have assumed the maximization of
a single, integrated, organizational
objective. However, some other
models, such as those of William
son and Baumol, have also recog
nized the multiple-argument objec
tive. Krouse describes the organiza
tion’s objectives as the maximiza
tion of performance and the mini
mization of imputed cost.
The adaptation rule in Krouse’s
model requires upper level man
agers to adjust only the targeted
variables in order to bring about
optimal performance. All the other
variables are held constant at their
prevailing levels. This revision and
target-adaptation process of adjust
ment is formulated as continuous
and systematic.
This model describes the organ
izational decentralization process
and the iterative target adjustment
process, while recognizing multiple
goals and assuming interunit inde
pendence. Although models similar
in many respects to this model have
been presented before, Krouse
claims that the key aspect of his
model—attention to the sequence of
decisions—is novel. His treatment
of decision-making would appear
to be a more realistic description of
how organizations may attempt to
optimize their corporate activity
than is the optimal, result-oriented,
single-step analysis by simultaneous
equations. In summary, this inter
esting article explores an area in
the decentralization model that has
received little attention in previous
literature.
Marleen Izumi
The Ohio State University
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